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STATE JURISDICTION TO BfPOSE TAXES
HENRY ROTTSCHAEFERt
THE power of our states to impose taxes is either expressly or im-
pliedly limited by various provisions of the Constitution of the
United States. The restrictions on the power derived from the
federal commerce clause and from the principle that it may not be
so used as to interfere with the functioning of the federal government
or its agencies and instrumentalities have furnished the occasion for
numerous judicial decisions. The discussion that follows will, how-
ever, confine itself to considering the theory that a state can reach
those taxables only that are within its territorial boundaries. This
jurisdictional problem has now become in form one of construing
that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitu-
tion which prohibits states from depriving a person of property
without due process of law. That clause limits a state's taxing
jurisdiction regardless of the kind of tax it seeks to impose. It
is the judicial gloss on that text, particularly in its bearing on the
problem of multi-state property and inheritance taxes, that furnishes
the materials for the discussion.
The formal concept that has played an important. r~le in the
discussions of a state's jurisdiction to impose property and inheritance
taxes is that of situs. This elusive concept in reality denotes the
end term of a process of legal reasoning, which in turn constitutes
the legal basis for the further legal conclusion that a state has the
requisite jurisdiction to tax property or its transfer.1 The emphasis
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. See the author's State Juria-
diction of Income for Tax Purposes (1931) 44 HAnV. L. REv. 1075; The Powcer
of the States to Tax Intangibles (1931) 15 MINN. L. Rv. 741.
1. See the remarks of Mr. Justice Stone in his dissenting opinion in First
National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 331 (1932). This case wil
be hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Boston Bank Stock Case. It and
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v.
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on situs has at times obscured the more important factors operative
in developing judicial theories as to the constitutional limits on a
state's taxing power. It is, however, these factors rather than the
formal concept of situs that give such guidance as can be derived
from decided cases as to the probable course of future decisions in
this field. There are some situations in which the judgment that
property has a taxable situs within a given state is readily correlated
with rather easily established objective facts. The situs of tangible
realty is a function of its physical location for the purpose of de-
termining the state that can impose a property tax on it, and an
inheritance tax on its transfer, although several state courts have
employed the fiction of equitable conversion to permit its transfer
to be in effect taxed by the state of the decedent's domicile." A
creditor's security interest in tangible realty has itself a taxable
situs for purposes of property taxation in the state of the realty's
physical location.3 The sole taxable situs of such an incorporeal
right as a ferry franchise is in the state that has created it, a fact
easy of ascertainment.4
It is not as easy to discover readily recognizable objective factors
upon whose existence courts base their conclusions as to the taxable
situs of tangible personalty. The state of its owner's domicile is
entitled to assert what might be called a "residuary situs" even
though the property in question has never been, and can never be,
physically present within it, provided that such property has no
situs elsewhere.5 This doctrine is intelligible only on the assumption
that a situs of such property on the basis of the owner's domicile is
constitutionally subordinate to a situs based on some other factors.
The decisions make it clear that the permanent presence of tangible
personalty in a non-domiciliary state establishes a situs for it there
which the domiciliary state is required to recognize as depriving it
of its taxing jurisdiction over such property.6 It is not wholly clear
what degree of presence will suffice to give a non-domiciliary state
Missouri, 281 U .S. 586 (1930); and Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission,
282 U. S.' 1 (1930); will hereinafter be frequently referred to as "the recent
decisions" or "the recent inheritance tax decisions."
2. See Land Title & Trust Co. v. Tax Commission, 131 S. C. 192, 126 S. E.
189 (1925), which discusses the authorities for and against this view.
3. Savings & Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898),
The federal Supreme Court has not yet decided this matter as it involves state
inheritance taxes.
4. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 (1903).
5. Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63 (1911).
6. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.-Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905);
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
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power to tax such tangible personalty as ships, railroad rolling
stock, and motor busses and trucks.7 The Supreme Court has per-
mitted the non-domiciliary state to deal with such property by
methods reasonably adapted for ascertaining the amount of capital
invested in such equipment employed within it during the tax period
involved." That state is not restricted to taxing the specific units
of such equipment that can be shown to have acquired during the
tax period in question whatever degree of physical presence is
necessary as a basis for the conclusion that such specific units had
their situs within such state during such tax period.
It has generally been the formulae employed for measuring the
amount of such property within the non-domiciliary state that have
been assailed as violating due process when this form of taxation has
been employed.9 Various bases of allocation have been upheld under
particular fact situations, but, as in the case of other applications
of the unit rule, due process requires only that the allocation formulae
do not produce arbitrary results.10 The due process clause in its
application to the jurisdictional problem of the taxation of tangible
personalty and its transfer has aimed to prevent the simultaneous
multi-state taxation of such property or its transfer, but thus far
has not been applied to prevent such multi-state taxation as might
result from lack of uniformity among states in the selection of
allocation formulae and their application.
The employment of the due process clause of the Fourteentn
Amendment to eliminate the multi-state taxation of intangible per-
sonalty is of recent origin, but has already resulted in reversing
constitutional doctrines of long standing. The decisions have thus
far been rendered in cases involving state inheritance taxes. The
principles invoked to reach these reversals of prior decisions, how-
ever, raise questions as to how much of the law governing the
jurisdiction of states to impose property taxes on intangible per-
sonalty, established by decisions made prior to the development of
these later doctrines, is still operative. The logical development of
the implications of some of those principles involve changes that
may effect considerable impairment of the ability of some states to
raise the revenues required for their governmental operations. The
important question is whether the Court is likely to carry through
7. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891); Ameri-
can Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70 (1899). See Powell, Taxa-
tion of Things in Transit (1921) 7 VA. L. Rav. 167, 245, 429, 497.
8. Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275 (1919).
9. See cases cited supra notes 7, 8.
10. See cases cited supra notes 7, 8.
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those implications to their logical conclusion. The consideration of
that question demands a resum6 of the recent cases that have raised
it, and an analysis of the reasoning by which the decisions in those
cases were reached.
The case of Farmers Loan & Trust Company 'v. Minnesota"1 was
the first to break with the earlier theory that due process did not
prohibit multi-state taxation of the transfers of intangibles. That
involved an inheritance tax imposed by Minnesota upon the transfer
of bonds of that state and some of its political subdivisions that were
owned by a person dying domiciled in New York. It would be
difficult to conceive a case in which the taxing state's power over
the debtor could be greater, and that factor had been held a sufficient
jurisdictional basis for a non-domiciliary state's imposition of an
inheritance tax in Blackstone v. Miller'12 more than a quarter of a
century before Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota was decided.
There had been during the intervening years no authoritative de-
cisions involving inheritance taxes even intimating that a non-
domiciliary state lacked power to impose such taxes on the transfer
of intangible personalty. There had, on the contrary, been decisions
adding to the factors on which such a state could base such a tax,
the mere presence of notes for safe-keeping within it,1 and the fact
that the property transferred consisted of shares of stock of a
corporation incorporated within it.14 The r6gime of multi-state
inheritance taxation of the transfer of intangibles had been recognized
as constitutional in the case of Frick v. Pennsylvania; 15 and attempts
to reduce that evil by deducing from the due process clause a pro-
hibition against the levy of an inheritance tax by the state of
decedent's domicile on the transfer of bonds permanently held for
safe-keeping in another state, on the theory that such bonds were
tangibles within the principle against multi-state taxation of the
transfer of tangibles, were defeated in Blodgett v. Silberman,10 decided
about two years prior to Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota.
However, there soon appeared intimations that the desire to prevent
multi-state taxation of intangibles was entering as a factor in the
Supreme Court's consideration of the jurisdictional problem. Safe
11. Supra note 1. This case will be frequently referred to hereinafter as
the Minnesota Bond Case.
12. 188 U. S. 189 (1903).
13. Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434 (1914).
14. Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 6.
15. Ibid.
16. 277 U. S. 1 (1928).
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Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia 17 involved an attempt by Virginia
to impose a property tax on stocks and bonds owned and kept in
Maryland by a Maryland trust company under a deed of trust
executed by a resident of Virginia for ultimate distribution to a
person who resided in Virginia during the period for which the
tax was imposed. The attempt was held to violate due process.
The Court in its opinion, while discussing the application of the
fiction mobilid personam sequuntur, stated:
'It would be unfortunate, perhaps amazing, if a legal fiction originally
invented to prevent personalty from escaping just taxation, should compel
us to accept the irrational view that the same securities were within two
states at the same instant and because of this to uphold a double and
oppressive assessment."
The factor that thus received incidental recognition has since played
a major part in unsettling established doctrines. Its importance for
future developments is not yet capable of precise formulation be-
cause competing premises are still being strongly urged.
The reasoning of Mr. Justice McReynolds in Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota first formulated the case for what may now
be called the theory that due process requires all states to recognize
that there occurs but a single taxable transfer when intangible
personalty passes from its deceased owner to his successors. The
substantial factors that induced the majority of the Court to accept
that view were that the contrary view found in the earlier cases
had produced friction among the states and other generally harmful
consequences. It was urged that the primitive conditions of the
earlier period had passed away, that business was now being con-
ducted on a national scale, and that a large part of the national wealth
was invested in negotiable securities whose protection against dis-
criminatory, unjust and oppressive taxation was a matter of the
greatest moment. There is no evidence that this discriminatory,
unjust and oppressive burden consisted in anything other than the
multi-state taxation of the transfer of such securities under modern
conditions of the distribution of capital and its ownership, which
clearly have little regard to state lines. It was these considerations
that dictated the view that the general reasons inhibiting the taxation
of tangible personalty by more than one state applied "under present
circumstances equally to intangibles."
The discussions in Baldwin v. Missouri18 and Beidler V. South
17. 280 U. S. 83 (1929).
18. Supra note 1.
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Carolina Tax Commission,9 cases in which the principles of Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota were extended to inheritance taxes
on notes present in the taxing state, some of them of local debtors
and secured by local assets, and on credits evidenced by open accounts,
add *nothing to the theory of the prevailing opinion already discussed.
The prevailing opinion in First National Bank of Boston V. Maine,2d
however, adduced several reasons additional to those found in the
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. Case. It was therein decided that the
state of the corporate domicile had no power to impose an inheritance
tax on the transfer of corporate shares owned by a person dying
domiciled in another state, even though it credited against the tax
claimed by it the inheritance paid to the state of decedent's domicile
on the transfer of such shares. The power to impose such tax was,
under the facts of that case, held restricted to the decedent's domi-
ciliary state. This was a complete reversal of a position taken in
Frick v. Pennsylvania,2' in which the claim of the state of the
corporate domicile had been held superior to that of the state of
decedent's domicile to such an extent that the latter was required
to reduce the value of the shares on which the tax was based by the
amount of the tax paid on their transfer to the state of the corporate
domicile. The new reasons urged in this opinion deserve more than
passing comment.
It is stated at the outset that the principle of immunity from multi-
state taxation developed in the prior decisions was broader than the
applications thereof made in those cases, and that, as applied to
death taxes, it rested for its justification
"upon the fundamental conception that the transmission from the dead
to the living of a particular thing, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is
an event which cannot take place in two or more states at one and the
same time."
The opposite view is said to involve a physical impossibility as applied
to tangible property, and "an inherent and logical self-contradition"
as applied to intangible property. These views are reinforced by
the statement that:
"Due regard for the processes of correct thinking compels the conclusion
that a determination fixing the local situs of a thing for the purpose of
transferring it in one state carries with it an implicit denial that there is
a local situs in another state for the purpose of transferring the same
thing there."
19. Supra note 1.
20. Supra note 1.
21. Supra note 6.
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This reasoning would have greater cogency were it not for the fact
that the transfer of property and the idea of situs denote legal
conceptions whose content is not necessarily limited by physical
factors or the requirements of logical consistency. There may be
sound reasons why the law should, for tax purposes, treat the transfer
of a tangible as occurring only at the place where such tangible has its
physical location, but that it does not involve a physical impossibility
to treat it as occurring elsewhere can be easily demonstrated.
It has, for example, been held in Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky 22
that the state of the owner's domicile could tax ships that never had
been, and never could be, physically within that state. There is no
doubt but that the same state would be permitted to impose an in-
heritance tax on their transfer on the death of their owner were such
owner a natural person dying domiciled in that state instead of a
corporation organized under its laws. The same would be true of any
tangible personalty whose physical presence outside the domiciliary
state was insufficient to give it a situs outside such state. Similarly
there may be sound reasons for confining to a single state, generally
that of decedent's domicile, the power to tax the transfer of in-
tangible personalty, but the logical difficulty said to be implied in
the contrary view is scarcely one of them since that exists only if
the conclusion itself be taken as the premise whose logically con-
sistent implicates are to be developed. The opinion itself adverts
to the more substantial reasons that lend support to this position
which had already been stated in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. V.
Minnesota. It adds the further reason that it would be anomalous
and grossly unfair to permit the transfer of tangibles to be taxed
in but one state while permitting the transfer of intangibles, which
are "quite as much within the protecting reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment," to be taxed by as many as four states.
It is clear from the foregoing resum6 of the reasoning that has
prevailed with the majority of the Supreme Court that the prin-
ciples of the decisions just reviewed are likely to receive still further
applications in the field of inheritance taxation, and may even come
to be applied in the field of state property taxes on intangible
personalty. The principal factor that renders it uncertain as to
how far those theories will be carried is the reasoning in the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Minnesota, and in the dissenting opinions in that case, in
Baldwin v. Missouri, and in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine.
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented in the first of these cases on the score
that the laws of Minnesota were necessary to the continued existence
22. Supra note 5.
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of the obligation of the bonds so that its assistance was necessary
to acquire a right, and that it could demand a quid pro quo therefor,
an argument adequately answered by Mr. Justice Stone in his
concurring opinion in that case.
Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri directs atten-
tion to more fundamental factors. It is predicated on the protection
the assets in question received from Missouri, and on the desirability
of allowing the states a high degree of freedom in shaping their tax
policies. The views of Mr. Justice Stone are likely to prove more
influential in shaping the Court's policy in this field despite the fact
that they have thus far proved ineffectual to stay the reversal of
earlier doctrines. His concurring opinion in the Minnesota Bond
Case started from the premise that a state could impose a privilege
tax, such as an inheritance tax, only if the privilege is enjoyed
within it, and held the tax in question invalid because the transfer
of the bonds was completely effected in, and controlled by the laws
of, the decedent's domiciliary state. It did, however, adopt the
position that a non-domiciliary state could tax if an act essential to
a completed transfer, which ordinarily could be compelled only
within it and in accordance with its laws, occurred within that state.
It was the existence of this factor, predicated on the presence of
the assets in Missouri and the fact that a transfer by delivery there
made would have defeated a transfer made in the domiciliary state,
that led him to dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri. It is certain that his
dissent is directed at the theory that the due process clause prohibits
multi-state inheritance taxation of intangibles, rather than at the
preference accorded the domiciliary state under the circumstances
present in Baldwin v. Missouri. His view is that the payment of a
tax in two places on the same economic interest, with respect to
which its owner has sought and secured the benefits of the laws in
both, is not so oppressive and arbitrary as to violate due process.
There is thus a correlation of the power to tax an economic interest
or its transfer with benefits and protection accorded it by the taxing
state and received by the owner as the result of his own voluntary
acts.
The same correlation is referred to in his dissent in the Boston
Bank Stock Case. His position seems to be that the due process
clause should not be construed to deprive a state of power to tax
unless it is unable in a practical sense to protect the taxed economic
interest, a position similar to that taken by Mr. Justice Holmes in
his dissent in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia.8 The principle
23. Supra note 17.
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to be deduced from the due process provision is, in his view, that
there are certain situations in which a single economic interest bears
such a legal relationship to different taxing jurisdictions as to justify
its taxation by more than one of them. The presence of the assets
in Missouri in charge of the agent of the decedent owner who died
domiciled in Illinois can be taken as an instance of that type. An
important factor that led to his dissent in the Boston Bank Stock
Case was that the non-resident decedent had acquired rights and
privileges with respect to a corporation created by Maine whose
nature and extent were defined by its laws and which were so far
subject to its control that his power to secure a complete transfer
thereof was dependent upon them. The same dissenting opinion
opposes to the argument that the multi-state inheritance taxation
of intangible personalty has produced intolerable evils the counter-
vailing consideration that there is no assurance that resort to the
Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument of reform will not create
more difficulties and injustices than it will remove. The force of this
consideration is readily appreciated by those states that have seen
their taxable resources curtailed by the recent decisions, and will
be more fully felt by them if the implications of the reasoning that
has prevailed are logically extended to property taxes on intangibles.
The extent to which the recent decisions have modified the prior
distribution among the states of the power to tax the transfer of
intangible personalty depends not only on the restriction of that
power to a single state but also on the principles defining the state
that is to be accorded that power. The state of the decedent's domicile
has been preferred in all the decisions thus far rendered. This prefer-
ence was based in the Minnesota Bond Case on the reasoning that
prior decisions had determined that "in general intangibles may
be properly taxed at the domicile of their owner," and in Baldwin v.
Missouri on the ground that it was in that state that the credits
passed under decedent's will. The first of these reasons is rather
unconvincing since prior decisions had also held that the transfer
of credits could be taxed elsewhere than at decedent's domicile, one
of those decisions being expressly overruled. The reason assigned
does not, therefore, explain why the one line of authorities was
chosen rather than the other. The second of the above reasons is
insufficient since it amounts to no more than a categorical statement
of the legal conclusion itself. This problem has thus far received
its fullest consideration in the Boston Bank Stock Case. The issue
is formally solved by invoking and applying the fiction of mnobilia




"there is wanting, on the part of a state other than that of the domicile,
any real taxable relationship to the event which is the subject of the tax."
The less formal considerations relied on are, however, that
"practical considerations of wisdom, convenience, and justice alike dictate
the desirability of a uniform general rule confining the jurisdiction to
impose death transfer taxes as to intangibles to the state of the domicile."
The fact that a large majority of the states had adopted that rule
by reciprocal inheritance tax statutes is said to fortify those con-
siderations, despite the fact that Mr. Justice Stone in his dissenting
opinion deems that in general the only fair solution of the problem
of multi-state inheritance taxes on intangibles. That the preference
of the domiciliary state.may be subject to exceptions is quite prob-
able. The opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland in the Boston Bank
Stock Case states:
"We do not overlook the possibility that shares of stock, as well as other
intangibles, may be so used in a state other than that of the owner's domi-
cile as to give them a situs analogous to the actual situs of tangible per-
sonal property."
That this reference at least includes intangibles that have acquired
a business situs in a non-domiciliary state is certain since the case
of intangibles with such a situs was specifically excluded from the
decisions in the three earlier cases in this series of reversing de-
cisions. The language in the Minnesota Bond Case on this point
can easily be construed as intimating a preference for the state in
which credits and other intangibles have acquired a business situs.
There may also be other situations in which intangible personalty
will be held to have acquired a "situs analogous to the actual situs
of tangible personal property" so as to be taxable by a non-domi-
ciliary state. The existing situation, however, is this: In every
instance in which due process confines to a single state the power
to impose an inheritance tax on the transfer of intangible person-
alty, the state of the decedent's domicile will be given that power
unless the facts are such as to require an inference that the intangi-
ble has acquired in a non-domiciliary state a "situs analogous to
the actual situs of tangible personal property," in which case such
state alone will be given the power to tax its transfer. The decisions
thus far give practically no aid for determining what fact or factors
of policy will be deemed significant in deciding when an intangible
has acquired the requisite "situs" in a non-domiciliary state.
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court thus far have decided
that a state cannot impose an inheritance tax on the succession to
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bonds, registered or otherwise, notes, bank deposits, and credits
evidenced by open accounts, merely on the basis that the debtor is
domiciled within it; that it cannot impose such tax merely because
the bonds or notes "happen to be found" within it when their owner
dies; that it cannot impose such tax even when the notes thus found
within it are secured by mortgages on local realty; and that it can-
not impose such tax on the succession to shares of corporate stock
merely because the corporation is organized under its laws. Their
reasoning requires the inference that in these instances the state
of the decedent's domicile alone can impose the tax. Blacfktone v.
Miller and one of the rules of F7iA v. Pennsylvania have been spe-
cifically overruled, and it is doubtful whether anything remains
of the rule of Wheeler v. Sohmer,24 which had permitted a non-
domiciliary state to tax the transfer of notes on the sole basis of
their presence for safekeeping within it. Doubts as to its present
status arise because it has not been expressly overruled while cer-
tain language in Baldwin v. Missouri affords some slender basis
for the position that that case does not cover securities permanently
kept for safekeeping within a non-domiciliary state. The notes in
the Baldwin Case are described as happening to be found in Mis-
souri when their Illinois owner died. It is arguable that this could
not be said of notes permanently within Missouri for safe-keeping.
To include notes in the latter situation would tend to increase the
evasion of such tax as the domiciliary state might seek to impose
on their transfer through a judicious distribution of securities for
safe-keeping in non-domiciliary states. The Court specifically stated
that it was not necessary in the Baldwin Case to
"consider the possibility of establishing a situs in another state by one
who should undertake to arrange for succession there and thus defeat the
collection of death duties prescribed at his domicile."
It has, however, been stated that a non-domiciliary state did not
acquire power to impose property taxes on notes that had been
sent to a local agent of the owner for safe-keeping merely because
they had been sent into the state to facilitate evasion of their tax-
ation by another state; 25 but, on the other hand, the Court has on
more than one occasion indicated that the jurisdictional limits de-
ducible from the due process provision could be defined by taking
into account the effect of a jurisdictional rule upon the problem
of tax evasion.28 The case of securities held for safe-kheping in
24. Supra note 13.
25. Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392 (1907).
26. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 6.
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
a non-domiciliary state might well be considered as involving an
instance of a single economic interest bearing such legal relation-
ships to two states as to permit their transfer to be taxed in both,
but the strong current against multi-state transfer taxes is practi-
cally certain to prevent such result. If Wheeler v. Sohmer has been
impliedly overruled, then only the state of the decedent's domicile
will be permitted to impose the tax under the circumstances of that
case. Only another decision specifically raising the problem can
clarify the situation.
If it be assumed that it is still good law, the question arises
whether the principle that a single state only shall be permitted
to tax the transfer of intangibles will be applied so as to prohibit
the domiciliary state from taxing the transfer. Do the facts of that
case furnish an instance in which the owner can be deemed to have
so used the securities in a state other than that of his domicile as
to have given them therein a "situs analogous to the actual situs
of tangible personal property"? Furthermore, would they acquire
such a situs in a non-domiciliary state if they had been sent into
it for safe-keeping as part of an arrangement to "defeat the col-
lection of death duties prescribed at his domicile"? These are
questions to which future decisions alone can give an authoritative
answer. They suggest, however, that not all the considerations of
wisdom and convenience justify the preference heretofore shown
for the domiciliary state, and that there are substantial factors sup.
porting Mr. Justice Stone's position in his dissent in the Boston
Bank Stock Case that there is assurance that resort to the Four-
teenth Amendment to deal with the problem of multi-state inheri-
tance taxes will not create more difficulties than it will remove.
The exact present status of the taxation of the transfer of credits
having a business situs in a non-domiciliary state cannot be definitely
stated. Barring reversals of the present trend, it is certain that
the taxation of their transfer will be confined to one state. 'The
uncertainty exists only as to which state will be permitted to im-
pose the tax, with present intimations rather favoring the state
of the business situs. This is a valid recognition of that state's
superior economic claim to deal with such credits as part of their
owner's assets employed in business within it. The same consid-
erations apply to a partner's interest in the partnership's business
and assets, so that a deceased partner's interest should be localized
for tax purposes where the business is conducted and the assets
are employed. That is the economic fact, however much the legal
issues may be complicated by questions as to the legal nature of a
partner's interest in its business and assets.
The Supreme Court has, however, decided that where, under the
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partnership agreement and the laws of the state in which the part-
nership's business and assets were located, the partner's interest
is a right to receive his share of the partnership's net value, that
share is intangible personalty having a situs for inheritance tax
purposes at his domicile. Hence that state does not violate due
process by taxing the transfer of a deceased resident's interest in
a non-resident partnership. 7 There have been state decisions per-
mitting the non-domiciliary state in which the partnership trans-
acted its business to tax the transfer of a non-resident partner's
interest therein.2S If the Court should translate into law its inti-
mations that the state in which credits have a business situs alone
should be permitted to tax their transfer, it will be difficult to
avoid extension of that theory to the transfer of a deceased part-
ner's interest in the partnership's business and assets. There would
be nothing oppressive in such a result, although it may involve
difficulties and inconvenience in the case of partnerships operating
in more than one state. Those difficulties might be overcome by
allocating to each of such states a fair proportion of the unitary
value of the whole of such deceased partner's interest in accordance
with methods employed in connection with the imposition of
property taxes on the corporate excess by non-domiciliary states.0
It is quite true that this solution would not be as convenient as the
method that localizes the transfer of such interest at the deceased
partner's domicile. It is at least clear that the existing status of
Blodgett v. Silberman is problematical.
The considerations above adduced for the case of a deceased part-
ner's interest would seem to be equally applicable to the transfer
of a seat on an exchange or board of trade. The Supreme Court
has not yet passed on state inheritance taxation of this type of
intangible, but its decisions sustain the imposition of property taxes
thereon by both the state in which the exchange is located 20 and
that of its owner's domicile.31 The taxation of the transfer of such
property is quite likely to be confined to a single state, although it
will in most cases involve a single economic interest with respect
to which the owner is receiving the protection of both the afore-
mentioned jurisdictions. Present indications are, however, that the
theories of Mr. Justice Stone have not gained sufficient acceptance
27. Blodgett v. Silberman, supra note 16.
28. See In re Henry, 203 App. Div. 456, 197 N. Y. Supp. 63 (1st Dep't
1922), modified on another point, 237 N. Y. 204, 142 N. E. 586 (1923); Small's
Estate, 151 Pa. 1, 25 Ati. 23 (1892).
29. See Isaacs, The Unit Rule (1926) 35 YALn L. J. 838.
30. Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U. S. 184 (1916).
31. Citizens National Bank v. Durr, 257 U. S. 99 (1921).
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to warrant a belief that this problem will be solved by reference
to them. If that be correct, then the question of deciding which
of the two states shall be given the power to tax the transfer
arises. It might be argued that this power should be awarded the
state in which the exchange is located since it is there that the
rights the seat confers are ultimately exerciseable. 82 The case for
the domiciliary state is, however, equally sound on economic grounds
in every instance in which the rights and privileges conferred by
the seat are employed in a brokerage business carried on in the
domiciliary state. The net result is an uncertainty that only future
decisions can resolve.
There are other situations on which the Supreme Court has not
yet passed that require brief mention. The most important of
these involves the problem of state inheritance taxation of the trans-
fer of a decedent's beneficial interest in property held in trust. It
has heretofore been held that the state of the decedent's domicile,83
the state of the principal administration of the trust, 4 and that
in which the trust realty had its situs,33 can tax the transfer of
such interest. In none of these decisions was the constitutional
question specifically discussed, but their arguments purported to
deal with the jurisdictional problem. These cases furnish instances
of different states taxing a transfer on inconsistent theories within
the meaning of that conception as thus far developed by the Supreme
Court. The emphasis, in the Boston Bank Stock Case, on the theory
that there is but a single transfer of a thing or interest that occurs
at a decedent's death renders it almost certain that existing prac-
tises in this matter that have been countenanced by the decisions
of state courts, will be held violative of due process.
The Minnesota supreme court, which had held in Thorne v. State
that Minnesota could tax the transfer of certificates of beneficial
interest in the Great Northern Ore Trust owned by a New York
decedent on the basis that the trust's principal place of adminis-
tration was in the state, has recently overruled that decision as
to those 6ertificates because it felt compelled to do so by the recent
Supreme Court rulings. It took the position that those certificates
were in substance like shares of corporate stock.80 The Minnesota
32. See opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Citizens National Bank v. Durr,
supra note 31, at 110.
33. Dana v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 227 Mass. 562, 116 N. E. 941
(1917).
34. Thorne v. State, 145 Minn. 412, 177 N. W. 638 (1920).
35. Baker v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 253 lass. 130, 148
N. E. 593 (1925).
36. In re Kennedy's Will, 242 N. W. 697 (Minn. 1932).
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court did not consider the alternative that the situation might come
within the class in which the Supreme Court may ultimately hold
a non-domiciliary state entitled to exercise the single right to tax
the transfer. It was probably correct in deciding that the situation
required the principle against multi-state taxation of the transfer
of intangibles to be applied, and in holding that the state of dece-
dent's domicile was the state having the sole power to impose the
tax.
The formal factor on which a state's jurisdiction to impose an
inheritance tax on the transfer of property has been made to depend
is the situs of the property transferred. The jurisdiction of states
to impose property taxes has also been defined in terms of the situs
of the property. It is clear from the recent Supreme Court rulings
that the significant factors in developing the law as to a state's
power to tax the transfer of intangible personalty have been con-
siderations of policy. Such factors, even before those rulings, had
played a part in developing the implications of due process for the
problem of a state's taxing jurisdiction. The desire to prevent
multi-state property and inheritance taxes had played its part in
developing the rule that a domiciliary state cannot, on the mere
basis of that factor, tax tangible personalty with an "actual situs"
elsewhere, 37 or tax its transfer under such circumstances. 3 Con-
siderations based on countervailing policies, including the desire
to prevent intangibles from evading taxes, had resulted in judicial
approval of both multi-state property taxation and inheritance tax-
ation of intangible personalty. These had been supplemented and
-reinforced by applying to this tax problem technical theories and
premises that had been evolved for other purposes.
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court have practically rele-
gated all other considerations to a position of insignificance in
making the avoidance of multi-state taxation the dominant factor
in dealing with a state's jurisdiction to impose inheritance taxes
on the transfer of intangible personalty. The questions must be
faced as to whether this change in position is likely to be carried
over to the imposition of property taxes on intangible personalty,
-and what changes that would effect in the existing law. The Supreme
Court has not as yet applied the principle to property taxes. The
multi-state inheritance taxation of intangible personalty has now
been prohibited with respect to the most important classes of such
intangibles. The opinion of the Court in the Minnesota Bond Case,
37. Supra note 6.
38. Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 6.
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after stating that tangibles having a permanent situs in a state,
and their transfer, may be taxed only by the state where they are
found, adds that
"the general reasons declared sufficient to inhibit taxation of them by two
states apply under present circumstances with no less force to intangibles
with taxable situs imposed by due application of the legal fiction."
The same thought is repeated in the statement that
"we can find no sufficient reason for saying that they [intangibles] are
not entitled to enjoy an immunity against taxation at more than one place
similar to that accorded to tangibles."
This language is broad enough to include property as well as
inheritance taxes. The probability that it does include property
taxes is enhanced when the reasons leading to the overruling of
Blackstone v. Miller are considered. These were that multi-state
inheritance taxation of intangibles tended to produce friction among
the states and that its results had been bad. It was also stated in
substance that that large portion of the country's wealth invested
in negotiable securities was entitled to protection against discrim-
ination and unjust and oppressive taxation. It would seem that
the last of these considerations would apply to an even greater extent
to an annually recurring tax such as the property tax than to an
inheritance tax imposed at infrequent intervals. The crux of the
evil and the reason for the threat to good relations among the states
would seem to lie to no slight degree in the barrier that multi-state
inheritance taxation opposed to the development of a capital market
on a national scale. The practise may also have contributed to bad
feeling among the states because differences in practises among the
states produced grievances against states that sought to encourage
the investment therein of out of state capital or to promote incor-
poration under their laws. But whatever specific evils the court
may have had in mind, it seems that they would exist in aggravated
form with respect to multi-state property taxation of intangibles.
The reasoning of the prevailing opinion in the Minnesota Bond Case,
therefore, points to the conclusion that due process also confines
to a single state the poer to impose property taxes on intangible
personalty.
The prevailing opinion in the Boston Bank Stock Case repeated
those parts of the opinion in the Minnesota Bond Case referred to
in the preceding paragraph. It also stated that the rule of im.
munity from taxation by more than one state deducible from the
case last mentioned, from Baldwin v. Missouri, and from Beidler
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v. South Carolina Tax Commission, was broader than the applica-
tions thus far made of it. This is followed by the statement that:
"In its application to death taxes, the rule rests for its justification
upon the fundamental conception that the transmission from the dead to
the living of a particular thing, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is an
event which cannot take place in two or more states at one and the same
time."
This reasoning specifically excludes direct application to property
taxes. It is, however, fairly arguable that, since it is intended to
indicate the basis on which rests the application to inheritance
taxes of a broader principle to which the court has just referred,
it inferentially warrants the conclusion that the broader principle
was intended to include another kind of tax, that is, the property
tax. It is also arguable that, if transmission of an intangible from
the dead to the living cannot occur in two states at one and the
same time, neither can an intangible be owned by a person in two
states at one and the same time. Furthermore, if, as this opinion
states, it involves a logical self-contradiction to treat the transfer
of an intangible as occurring in two or more states at one and the
same instant, equally so would it seem to involve such logical con-
tradiction to treat an intangible as being owned in two or more
states at one and the same time. It is quite true that the reasoning
of the opinion that is made the basis of this argument is rather
unconvincing, and that this weakens the argument. That reason-
ing, however, furnishes a datum that can validly be employed in
determining the probable future extension of the principle against
multi-state taxation, and the foregoing argument lies well within
the methodological range of analogical legal reasoning. The rea-
soning of the prevailing opinion in the Boston Bank Stock Case
may, accordingly, be said to increase the probability that the trend
against multi-state taxation of intangibles will be extended to pro-
perty taxes.
The only case in which the Supreme Court has discussed the
problem of multi-state property taxation of intangible personalty
in a manner pertinent to the present inquiry is Safe Deposit & Tntst
Co. v. Virginia.3  There had been numerous earlier cases in which
the taxation of the same intangible by more than one state had been
held valid on the theory that the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not prohibit double taxation in all instances.
The decision in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia went no further
39. Supra note 17.
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than to decide that a state other than that of the domicile of the
holder of the legal title of an intangible cannot impose a property
tax on that legal interest merely on the basis that the property had
been transferred in trust to the present legal owner by a resident
of the taxing state at the time of said transfer and that the ultimate
beneficiaries reside in that state. The reasoning of the prevailing
opinion is none too clear, but there appears near its close language
indicating that the Justices who agreed with that opinion viewed
the case as one in which Virginia was attempting to deduce its
power from the maxim mobilia ersonam sequuntur, and that they
refused to permit this because it would involve the perversion of
a maxim invented to prevent personalty from escaping taxation
by employing it to support
"the irrational view that the same securities were within two states at
the same instant and because of this to uphold a 'double and oppressive
assessment."
This position furnishes a strong argument for the view that the
court deems that the principle against the multi-state taxation of
intangibles extends to property taxes. The decision itself does
not require that conclusion. It only, denies that certain factors
constitute a sufficient basis on which a non-domiciliary state
can predicate a power to tax the legal title to intangibles held
in trust, as an earlier decision had denied such a state the
power to tax such interest in trust property on the sole basis
of the residence of the cestui within it.4o The trust property
included shares of stock which under existing decisions can be
subjected to property taxes by the state of the legal owners
domicile 41 and that of the corporate domicile.42 The case does not
decide that those stocks might not be validly taxed by both those
jurisdictions. The same remarks would apply with respect to any
other trust assets that under existing decisions can still be taxed by
more than one state. Part of the reasoning in Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Virginia can be construed as favoring the theory that multi-
state property taxation of intangibles violates due process, but the
decision itself can by no means be so construed.
The foregoing comprises the case for the view last referred to.
The theory of Mr. Justice Stone that a single economic interest may
bear such legal relations to more than one state as to justify its
taxation by all of them has thus far had no effect on the course
40. Brooke v. Norfolk, 2'77 U. S. 27 (1928).
41. -Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1 (1914).
42. Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 (1905).
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of decisions involving inheritance taxes. The same is true of his
theory that any state that has accorded protection to an economic
interest ought to be allowed to tax it if its owner has sought that
protection. These views do, however, direct attention to considera-
tions that assume added importance when applied to property taxes
which might be viewed as annual payments for such protection.
This factor might be sufficient to turn the scales against extending
to property taxes the logical implications of some of the reasoning
that has thus far prevailed in respect of inheritance taxes. There
is also the consideration, referred to by Mr. Justice Holmes in his
dissent in Baldwin v. Missouri, that the due process clause is in
danger of being extended so as to interfere unduly with the state's
taxing powers. This implied plea for a recognition of a state's
interest in maintaining considerable freedom in shaping its tax
policies stresses a factor that has failed to receive the consideration
it merits in the prevailing opinions in the recent decisions. The
effects of extending their doctrines to property taxes would be more
serious in so far as such taxes are annually recurring charges
whereas an inheritance tax is levied only occasionally. This factor,
in a sense, balances the consideration already referred to that the
evils that the recent decisions were intended to obviate would be
present to a greater extent under a system of multi-state property
taxes.
Income taxes also involve annual charges. Multi-state income
taxes would seem to be at least as great an evil as multi-state in-
heritance taxes. It has, however, been repeatedly decided that a
state other than that of the domicile of the recipient of the income
does not violate due process by taxing a non-resident's income de-
rived from sources within the taxing state 3 The first case in which
the Supreme Court passed on the power of the domiciliary state to
impose an income tax was Maguire v. Trefry."4 This sustained the
power of such state to tax the income received by a resident bene-
ficiary from a trust established and administered in another state.
The opinion leaves it doubtful whether the tax was treated as one
on the person, measured by income from sources outside of the
state, or as on income from property, the cestu's equitable interest,
having its situs in the taxing state. The domiciliary state's power
to tax a resident on income derived from business wholly conducted
in another state has been recently sustained against the claim that
43. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Co.,
252 U. S. 60 (1920).
44. 253 U. S. 12 (1920).
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this deprived the taxpayer of property without due process of law.4"
There is no reason for assuming that the Court intended to over-
rule its prior decisions under which the non-domiciliary state in
which this income was earned could also have taxed it. Multi-state
taxation of income from business sources is, therefore, constitu-
tionally possible, but whether the same is true as to income from
property sources has not yet been authoritatively determined. The
significance of this case for present purposes is that it may indicate
a present intention on the Court's part to restrict the prohibition
against multi-state taxation to inheritance taxes. It is also im-
portant because it bases the domiciliary state's power squarely
"upon the protection afforded to the recipient of the income by the state,
in his person, in his right to receive the income, and in his enjoyment
of it when received."
If such considerations justify a domiciliary state in taxing income
from out-of-state sources concurrently with the taxation of the same
income by the state in which it has its source, it would seem to be
equally reasonable to permit a domiciliary state to impose a property
tax on an intangible even though it were also taxable in some other
state, provided only that some reasonable basis could be found for
the latter imposition. The fact that the economic interest repre-
sented by the intangible received some benefits and protection from
the non-domiciliary state is clearly at the basis of permitting a state
to tax credits with a business situs therein on that basis. But there
are other intangibles that receive a marked degree of protection
from a non-domiciliary state which it would seem logical to permit
such state to tax. Furthermore, the evils of the multi-state taxa-
tion of income would seem to be at least as great as those involved
in multi-state property taxation of intangibles. If, then, the evils
of the multi-state taxation of income do not require the due process
clause to be so construed as to prohibit it, neither should that be
invoked to eliminate the similar evils of the multi-state property
taxation of intangible personalty. The resulting restriction of the
prohibition of multi-state taxation of intangibles to inheritance tax-
ation may well strike one as somewhat illogical and unreasonable
since the evils of such system seem less in the case of inheritance
than in the case of property taxes.
45. Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
See on state jurisdiction to impose taxes on income, Day, The Taxablo Situs
of Income (1922) 8 CORN. L. Q. 36; Kessler, Some Legal Problems in Stato
Personal Income Taxation (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 759, 863; Rottschaefor, State
Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes (1931) 44 HAnv. L. Rnv. 1075.
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It would be somewhat hazardous to predict the Court's ultimate
answer to the question whether multi-state property taxation of
intangible personalty is in all cases prohibited by the due process
clause. The best that can presently be done is to indicate the
changes in law that will occur if the prohibition against multi-state
taxation is thus extended, and to weigh the probabilities as to its
extension to specific types of intangibles.
The existing rule that a non-domiciliary state is prevented by
the federal Constitution from taxing a bond or credit on the sole
basis of the residence of the debtor within it is certain to remain
unaffected. 46 The theory that due process prevents a state from
taxing credits on the sole basis of the presence within it of the
instruments evidencing the credit, announced in Bvck v. Beach-I is
not likely to be abandoned, and is practically certain to be extended
to bonds when the case arises. The recent inheritance tax decisions
have merely strengthened the holdings under which the state of
the owner's domicile is permitted to tax bonds and credits,48 shares
of corporate stock,40 and seats on exchanges,60 with the possible
exception of the cases in which such credits have acquired a business
situs in another state or such intangibles have been so used in an-
other state "as to give them a situs analogous to the actual situs
of tangible personal property." If multi-state property taxes on
intangible personalty should ever be prohibited and the prohibition
extended to intangibles with a business situs or a situs "analogous
to the actual situs of tangible personal property" in a non-domi-
ciliary state, the intimated preference for the latter state, implied
in the opinions in the inheritance tax cases, is almost certain to
be carried over to property taxes. 1 The state of the corporate
domicile can also tax corporate shares owned by non-residents,02
and it has been held that due process is not violated when the state
in which an exchange is located taxes the seats owned by non-
46. Case of the State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 16 Wall. 300 (U. S.
1872); Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262 (U. S. 1868).
47. Supra note 25.
48. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879); Fidelity & Columbia Trust
Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54 (1917).
49. Hawley v. Malden, supra note 41.
50. Citizens National Bank v. Durr, supra note 31.
51. That such state can now tax credits on the basis of their business situs
within it, see New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899); Bristol v. Wash-
ington County, 17 U. S. 133 (1900). See Powell, Tho Business Situs of Credits
(1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89.
52. Corry v. Baltimore, supra note 42.
1933]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
residents.53 These intangibles are accordingly subject to multi-state
property taxation.
The economic interests represented by the share or the seat on
the exchange clearly derive continuing benefits and protection of
considerable importance from the state of the corporate domicile
or that in which the exchange is located." That would seem to
justify construing due process in such a manner as to permit them
to impose property taxes thereon. Nor does it seem unfair for the
states in which the owners of such property are domiciled to include
it in measuring the tax due it from such owners, in view of the
fact that its ultimate benefits are quite likely to be there enjoyed.
The economic interest represented by such property may not un-
reasonably be said to bear some continuing legal relation to the
domiciliary state. That state's power to impose property taxes on
intangible personalty has at times been justified as a valid measure
of the advantages conferred by it, and hence of the owner's duty
to pay it taxes.5 5 Nothing in the inheritance tax decisions has im-
paired the force of this consideration as applied to prpperty taxes,
and its validity would seem to be quite independent of the tax
treatment accorded such intangibles by another state. Cogent legal
and economic reasons thus exist for continuing the existing regime
of multi-state property taxes on these intangibles.
If, however, due process is held to require its abandonment, the
theory urged by Mr. Justice Holmes in Citizens National Bank v.
Durr,50 that the rights and privileges conferred by an exchange
seat might well be localized where the exchange is situated, might
well be employed to confine its taxation to that state. The state
of the owner's domicile is likely to be preferred to that of the cor-
porate domicile if one only should be held constitutionally entitled
to tax corporate shares. If the taxation of credits with a business
situs in a non-domiciliary state is restricted to one state, that state
is practically certain to be given the power. There are good reasons
for dealing in the same manner with a partner's interest in the
partnership's business and assets.
The conduct of business employing tangibles frequently produces
an intangible variously described as good-will, franchise value, or
53. Rogers v. Hennepin County, supra note 30.
54. See opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Citizens National Bank v. Durr,
supra note 31, at 110, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in First
National Bank of Boston v. Maine, supra note 1.
55. See Fidelity & C. Trust Co. v. Louisville, supra note 48; Lawrence v.
State Tax Commission of Mississippi, supra note 45.
56. Supra note 31.
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corporate excess. The state of the corporate domicile has been
permitted to tax the whole of that intangible even where all the
income producing tangibles and business were outside it, and this
was held not to violate due process.r7 The non-domiciliary states in
which the business is conducted do not violate due process by taxing
a part of that intangible value determinable by the employment of
the "unit rule" system.5s This is another instance in which existing
decisions permit multi-state taxation of an intangible. It was the
desire to avoid that very result by localizing the intangible at the
owner's domicile that produced the dissents in the early cases es-
tablishing this system. The mere fact that it was established in
the very face of the contention that it would produce double taxa-
tion will probably be ignored if the question of extending the
prevailing judicial hostility to multi-state taxation to this situation
ever arises.
If the principle against such taxation is applied to this system,
it will be rather difficult to determine which state shall be permitted
to tax. The taxpayer's convenience would be best served by local-
izing this intangible at the corporate domicile. That would, how-
ever, ignore the superior economic claims of the states in which
are located the property and business to which it owes its existence.
To exclude that claim merely to prefer the one of a state having
no other basis for its claim than the fact that the corporation was
chartered by it, ignores economic realities, even if one allows for
the consideration that the state may have been selected for incor-
poration in order to secure some economic advantage for the cor-
poration or its stockholders. If the preference should be accorded
the non-domiciliary states, due process will probably not be con-
strued to require that the methods for determining the unit value,
and the allocation formula of the various states entitled to tax a
part of the corporate excess, be so related as to wholly avoid dupli-
cation of values. The only practical method for insuring that result
would be to have identical methods and formula in all such states,
and to use only factors objectively determinable so as to avoid
possible duplication of values resulting in the course of administer-
ing the laws. This would involve judicial action that is not likely
to be deduced from the due process clause.
57. Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325 (1920).
58. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185 (1897); Adams E.xpress,
Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171 (1897); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490 (1904);
Southern Ry. Co. v. Kentucky, 274 U. S. 76 (1927).
1933]
328 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42
The cases that have thus far been considered have all dealt with
situations involving a single legal interest representing any given
person's distributive share in a single economic interest. The de-
cisions in the inheritance tax cases prohibit the localization of such
interest in more than one state for inheritance tax purposes even
when that interest belongs to the legal category of intangible per-
sonal property. Our legal system, however, recognizes many sit-
uations in which a single economic interest is treated as supporting
a series of legally recognized interests therein. The ultimate
economic interest supporting a mortgagor's and mortgagee's legal
interest in mortgaged realty is identical to the extent of the amount
of the loan secured by the mortgage. That loan represents a lia-
bility of the mortgagor that reduces his net wealth by the amount
thereof. The social wealth has not been increased by the mere fact
that the lender has transferred a part of his own assets to the
borrower in return for a promise of future repayment and a con-
tingent claim on certain of the borrower's assets. The taxation of
the realty at its full value to the mortgagor and the simultaneous
taxing of the secured credit to the mortgagee involves a type of
double taxation that is clearly permissible whether both taxes be
imposed by the same or different states.59
The same multiple taxation occurs when the corporate assets are
taxed to the corporation simultaneously with the taxation of the
corporate shares by the same or another state, but this too has
never been deemed prohibited by due process. The same duplica-
tion of taxable wealth, through the recognition of different legal
interests in the same ultimate economic value, occurs whenever the
trustee and the cestui are treated as having separate taxable in-
terests in the same assets held in trust. It has been held that due
process is not violated by a tax imposed on the trust res by the state
of the trustee's domicile.°0 The trust res in that case consisted of
intangible personalty. The problem of whether any other state
could, consistently with due process, impose property taxes thereon
is the same as though the property were not held in trust. That
the state of the cestui's domicile cannot on that basis alone tax the
trustee's legal interest is established by Brooke v. Norfolk.0  That
that factor, coupled with the fact that the property was transferred
to a foreign trustee by a resident settlor, whose entire interest had
ceased at the time the tax was imposed, will not support the tax on
59. This seems a fair inference from Paddell v. New York, 211 U. S. 446
(1908).
60. Welch v. Boston, 221 Mass. 155, 109 N. E. 174 (1915).
61. Supra note 40.
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the trustee's legal interest is clear from Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Virginia.62
Whether the state of the settlor's domicile may validly impose a
tax on the legal interest in intangible personalty of a non-resident
trustee during the time when the settlor retains a beneficial or other
power to revoke the transfer has not yet been authoritatively de-
termined,6 3 and the same is true with respect to the question of
what effect permitting such state to tax under such circumstances
would have on the power of the state of the trustee's domicile to
tax the interest at the same time. It is certain that the power to
tax a trust res consisting of realty or tangible personalty having
an "actual situs" in a state other than that of the trustee's domicile
would be restricted to the state in which such realty was situated
or such tangible personalty had its "actual situs" the same as if
the like property were not held in trust.
It has, however, also been held that due process permits the state
of the cestui's domicile to impose a property tax on his interest even
though the trust was created under the will of a non-resident, the
trustee is a non-resident, and the trust is being administered in
another state.6 That the Supreme Court would sustain this posi-
tion is quite probable.65  The question arises whether this equitable
interest can validly be subjected to multi-state inheritance and
property taxation. Reference has already been made to the fact
that the Minnesota Supreme Court has construed the cestul's in-
terest as intangible personalty on whose transfer the cestu's domi-
cile alone can impose an inheritance tax.c The trust res in that
case consisted of corporate shares. The trust r'es may, however,
consist of tangible realty or tangible personalty having an "actual
situs" in a state other than that of the cestui's domicile. There
exist at present no data on which an answer can be given to the
question whether the state in which the realty was located or in
which such tangible personalty had an "actual situs" will be per-
mitted to localize the cestui's interest therein for purposes of prop-
erty taxation thereof or inheritance taxation of its transfer. Nor
are there adequate data for hazarding an answer to the question
62. Supra note 17.
63. The state of decedent's domicile can validly impose an inheritance tax
on the transfer of intangibles that decedent had transferred to a foreign trustee
by a deed in which he reserved the power to revoke. Bullen v. Wisconsin,
240 U. S. 625 (1916).
64. Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. E. 103 (1896).
65. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra note 17.
66. In re Kennedy's Will, supra note 36.
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whether due process will be construed to limit to a single state
the imposition of such taxes in those situations.
The reasons for restricting to a single state the imposition of
inheritance taxes on the transfer of a cestui's interest where the
trust res consists of intangible personalty are equally applicable
to cases in which the trust res consists of realty or tangible person-
alty. The Minnesota decision last referred to is quite likely to be
followed on that point regardless of the character of the trust res.
The determination of which state shall be allowed to exert that
single taxing power is not as easy where the trust res is something
other than intangible personalty. The problem of whether multi-
state property taxation of a cestui's interest shall be permitted,
and, if not, what state shall be allowed to tax it, is tied up with
considerations already discussed when dealing with the probable
extension to property taxes of the principles of the recent inheri-
tance tax decisions. It is to be hoped that, if and when these
questions come before our courts, the decisions will be worked out
by reference to factors significant in tax matters rather than by
invoking theories developed for dealing with quite distinct prob-
lems.
The prevailing opinion in Baldwin v. Missouri explicitly stated
that that case did
"not involve the right of a state to tax either the interest which a mort-
gagee as such might have in lands lying therein, or the transfer of that
interest."
The reservation of those issues probably means no more than
that they are still open. If they are ever resolved by permitting
taxation of the security interest or its transfer by the state in
which the property comprising the security has its taxable situs,
the benefits sought to be achieved by the recent inheritance tax
decisions will be greatly limited unless the power of the state of
the decedent's domicile is concurrently and correspondingly cur-
tailed. The latter is quite improbable since the theory on which
the state in which the security is situated will be permitted to tax,
if it is allowed to do so, will involve no conflict with the principle
localizing the credit at decedent's domicile. The result will be that
the latter state will be permitted to tax the transfer of the credit
while the former will be allowed to tax the concurrent transfer of
the creditor's security interest. If the credit should be secured by
a mortgage on property in more than one state, the argument would
run in favor of all of them, at least so far as to permit each to tax
the transfer of the security interest on the basis of an allocated
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value, or, perhaps, even on a value equal to the value of the security
within the state. The friction and annoyance incidental to such a
system applied to corporate bonds make those against which the
decision in the Minnesota Bond Case was aimed seem insignificant.
The fact that a non-resident decedent's credit was secured by
realty in a non-domiciliary state has been held to draw the credit
into the latter so that the taxation of its transfer by such state was
deemed not violative of the federal constitution's prohibition against
a state's taxation of things beyond its jurisdiction. 7 This decision
can no longer, since Baldwin v. Missouri, be supported on that theory,
but the result may still be obtainable if the transfer of the security
interest should itself be held a valid and separate taxable subject.
The uncertainty surrounding this matter also applies to inheritance
taxation of the transfer of a resident vendor's interest in a land
contract relating to realty in another stateO and of a non-resident
vendor's interest under a land contract relating to realty within the
taxing state.69 These situations involve possibilities of multi-state
taxation of the same economic interest although the result is effected
through the treatment as taxable subjects of interests that have
received separate legal recognition., In this respect these and the
other situations considered in the last few paragraphs differ from
those involved in the cases in which the multi-state inheritance
taxation of intangibles has thus far been held to violate due process.
Some of the reasons supporting those applications of due process
would require that these situations receive similar treatment; others
of those reasons have no application thereto. The extension of
the prohibition of multi-state taxation to them is highly problem-
atical.
The preceding discussion has not aimed to set forth the whole
body of law governing the jurisdiction of states to impose property
and inheritance taxes even on intangible personalty, but rather to
indicate the probable extent to which the recent inheritance tax
decisions have disturbed the existing system of law on that subject
The effect, of those decisions has been as clearly favorable to the
states in which exist large capital accumulations representing in-
vestments spread throughout the nation as they have been un-
67. Kinney v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 207 Mass. 368, 93 N. E. 586
(1911).
68. State ex. rel. Hilton v. Probate Court, 145 Minn. 155, 176 N. W. 493
(1920). The constitutional issue is not specifically considered.
69. In re Roger's Estate, 149 Mich. 305, 112 N. W. 931 (1907). No con-
stitutional point was considered.
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favorable to the states in which those investments have been made.
This may be a just result in view of the fact that those investments
are frequently embodied in forms of property that are taxable by
the latter class of states and which would not be there but for the
capital accumulations owned in other states. Those decisions may
be viewed as making the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment function to promote a freer capital market within the
United States in a manner similar to that in which the commerce
clause has promoted a vast free-trade area throughout it. The
process might, if carried too far, restrict too severely the power
of what might be called the debtor states to adjust their tax systems
to their own views of proper tax policy, and it is arguable that the
creditor states are sufficiently repaid through the flow to them of
income from the investments made by their citizens in other states
without being accorded a further advantage in respect of their tax-
ing powers. These, at least, are some of the problems of policy
with which the recent interpretations of due process are inextric-
ably interwoven. There may be those who object to the intrusion
of considerations of policy into the problem of developing the spe-
cific content of the due process provision, but this technique is
unavoidable if the task is to be intelligently performed. It is to
be hoped, therefore, that when the issue of extending the scope of
the recent decisions arises, it will be approached and dealt with in
the light of these factors rather than through the manipulation of
legal theories developed for quite other problems.70
70. The following articles discuss the problem of a state's jurisdiction to
impose property and inheritance taxes; Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919)
32 HAav. L. Rzv. 587; Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purposo of
Administration, Garnishment and Taxation (1918) 31 HAav. L. Ruv. 905;
Nossaman, The Fourteenth Amendment in its Relation to State Taxation (1930)
18 CALm. L. R v. 345; Chambers, State Inheritance Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds
or Notes Secured by a Mortgage on Land in the State (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q.
172; .ason, Jurisdiction for the Purpose of Imposing Inheritance Taxes (1931)
29 MicH. L. Rnv. 324; Lowndes, Tendencies in the Taxation of Intangibles,
(1930) 17 VA. L. Rnv. 146; Lowndes, Basis of Jurisdiction in State Taxation
of Inheritances and Property (1931) 29 Micu. L. REY. 850; Lowndes, The
Passing of Situs-Jurisdietion to Tax Shares of Corporate Stock (1932) 45
HARV. L. RBv. 777; Powell, Extraterritorial Inheritance Taxation (1920) 20 CoL.
L. REV. 1, 283; Peppin, The Power of the State to Tax Intangibles or Their
Transfer (1930) 18 CALm. L. REV. 638; Rottschaefer, The Power of the States
to Tax Intangibles (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 741.
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